excerpts from Book I of RHETORIC
by Aristotle
translated by W. Rhys Roberts
Background on Aristotle's Rhetoric: A striking characteristic of Book
One is that nearly every statement in it is in direct contradiction to some
part of the Gorgias:
Gorgias Rhetoric
rhetoric is counterpart of cookery . . . counterpart of dialectic
rhetoric is unscientific (inartistic) . . . is artistic (just, noble, good)
rhetoric of no use to virtuous man . . . four important uses
rhetoric a tool of wrongdoers . . . a morally neutral tool
the goal of rhetoric is pleasure . . . is goodness (with happiness first)
Aristotle's threefold classification of speeches (adapted directly from the
Sophists) covers speaking current in the fourth century B.C., which did
not include sermons, after-dinner speeches, or satirical essays. In this
scheme, epideictic speaking is used as a catch-all category for everything
from schoolroom exercises in praise of mice to funeral orations and
panegyrics.
The really important contribution made by Aristotle's concept of enthymeme
is, after all, the implied injunction to look for the unstated premise, usually the
most important element of the reasoning.
(adapted from A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, James J. Murphy, ed.)
1
RHETORIC the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with
such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men
and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use,
more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to
discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to
attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through
practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the
subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to
inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and
others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an
inquiry is the function of an art.
Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things
that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites,
so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be,
the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be
blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the
possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say
to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies
instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here,
then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions
possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with
the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able
to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on
opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice
employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is
wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and
that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to
confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions:
dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite
conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not
lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that
are true and things that are better are, by their nature,
practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again,
(4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being
unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to
defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech
is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if
it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might
do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against
all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that
are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can
confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict
the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.
2
Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given
case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of
any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its
own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is
healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes,
arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and
sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the
means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is
why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned
with any special or definite class of subjects.
Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of
rhetoric and some do not. By the latter [i.e., inartistic proofs]
I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there
at the outset-witnesses,
evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the
former [i.e., artistic proofs] I mean such as we can ourselves
construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has
merely to be used, the other has to be invented.
Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are
three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the
speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of
mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words
of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal
character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him
credible [ethos]. We believe good men more fully and more readily
than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely
true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This
kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the
speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he
begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their
treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the
speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the
contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective
means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come
through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions [pathos]. Our
judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when
we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as
we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole
of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come
to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through
the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth
by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question
[logos].
There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The
man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1)
to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in
their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to
name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which
they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of
dialectic and also of ethical studies.
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof:
just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and
syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric.
The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the
apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a
rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every
one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either
enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who
proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions
(and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that
enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The
difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages
in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been
discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of
similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric;
when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further
and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence,
whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in
dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of
these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say:
for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here;
in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes;
and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some
at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the
other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder
applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper
uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the
processes themselves more clearly.
A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly
self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other
statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because
there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize
about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize
about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about
what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this
alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that
no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the
theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a
given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems
probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also.
Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard
materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials
that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular
subjects of debate. The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such
matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us,
in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated
argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.
The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the
main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a
syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few
propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal
syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact,
there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus,
to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the
prize is a crown, it is enough to say 'For he has been victor in the
Olympic games', without adding 'And in the Olympic games the prize
is a crown', a fact which everybody knows.
There are few facts of the 'necessary' type that can form the
basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make
decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with
alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we
deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent
character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again,
conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be
drawn from premises that do the same, just as 'necessary' conclusions
must be drawn from 'necessary' premises; this too is clear to us from
the Analytics. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming
the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary',
will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of
enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must
correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and
those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually
happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything
whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class
of the 'contingent' or 'variable'. It bears the same relation to
that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to
the particular. Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the
statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the
other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The
infallible kind is a 'complete proof' (tekmerhiou); the fallible
kind has no specific name.
The 'example' has already been described as one kind of induction;
and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it
from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the
proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to
part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When
two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than
the other, the former is an 'example'. The argument may, for instance,
be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming
to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for
a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make
himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara;
and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are
made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that
Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these
being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks
for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. We have now
described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly
supposed to be demonstrative.
But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished
these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the
elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must
employ.
3
Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes
of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in
speech-making--speaker, subject, and person addressed--it is the
last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The
hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things
past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about
future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely
decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows
that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political [deliberative],
(2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display [epideictic].
Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one
of these two courses is always taken by private counselors, as well
as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either
attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must
always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of
display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of
rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political
orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done
hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at
law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the
other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The
ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present,
since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things
existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to
recall the past and to make guesses at the future.
5
It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim
at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they
avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its
constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain
what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the
elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or
not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that
make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or
some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers
happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.
We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as
independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of
pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with
the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of
them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well
everybody agrees.
From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent
parts are:-good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good
children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily
excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic
powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man
cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these
internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no
others to have. (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal.
Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we
think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make
his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what
happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of
these parts of it is.
6
It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in
urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the
opposite of the former. Now the political or deliberative orator's aim
is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means
to ends, i.e. that it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good
thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts
about Goodness and Utility in general.
7
Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things
are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the
next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.
8
The most important and effective qualification for success in
persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to
understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their
respective customs, institutions, and interests. For all men are
persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies
in the maintenance of the established order. Further, it rests with
the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies
with each form of government; there are as many different supreme
authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of
government are four-democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The
supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either
a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers.
9
We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base,
since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall
at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the
required view of our own characters-our second method of persuasion.
The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people
are also the ways in which to make them trust our own. Praise,
again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or
divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of
the lower animals. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and
must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of
illustration only.
10
We have next to treat of Accusation and Defense, and to enumerate
and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein. There are
three things we must ascertain first, the nature and number of the
incentives to wrong-doing; second, the state of mind of wrongdoers;
third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition. We
will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define
the act of 'wrong-doing'.
11
We may lay it down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by
which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state
of being; and that Pain is the opposite. If this is what pleasure
is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this
condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the
soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. It must
therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of
being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete
recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as
soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is
a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what
happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events
often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is
unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory, painful, and it has
been rightly said
12
The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we are
next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the
persons to whom they do it.
15
There are also the so-called 'non-technical' means of persuasion;
and we must now take a cursory view of these, since they are specially
characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number: laws,
witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths.
